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Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
2001 Term
by RICHARD G. WILKINS *, SCOTT WORTHINGTON **,
ADAM BECKER ***, SARA BECKER ****
I. Introduction
This Study, the sixteenth in a series,' tabulates and analyzes the voting
behavior of the United States Supreme Court during the 2001 Term.2 The
analysis is designed to determine whether individual Justices and the Court
as a whole are voting more "conservatively," more "liberally," or about the
same when compared with past Terms. As in politics, whether a judicial
trend is "conservative" or "liberal" often lies in the eye of the beholder. A
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
** J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 1999. Associate, Robinson,
Seiler & Glazier.
*** J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2003.
**** J.D. Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2004.
1. Professor Robert E. Riggs began this study with Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1986
Term, 2 BYU J. PUB. L. 15 (1988). Professor Richard G. Wilkins continued the Study in
Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1991 Term, 7 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (1992) [hereinafter 1991
Study]. The last eight Studies, analyzing the 1993 to 2000 terms, were published in the Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly. See Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
1993 Term, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 269 (1995) (hereinafter 1993 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins,
et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1994 Term, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1995)
[hereinafter 1994 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1995 Term,
24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1996) [hereinafter 1995 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins, et al.,
Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1996 Term, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 35 (1997) [hereinafter
1996 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1997 Term, 26
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 533 (1999) [hereinafter 1997 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme
Court Voting Behavior: 1998 Term, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 423 (2000) [hereinafter 1998
Study]; Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1999 Term, 28 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 543 (2001) [hereinafter 1999 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins, et al., Supreme Court
Voting Behavior: 2000 Term, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 247 (2002) [hereinafter 2000 Study].
2. The 2001 United States Supreme Court Term covers decisions made from November
2001 to June 2002.
[307]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union could well paint an
ideological picture of the Court far different from one sketched by a lawyer
from the Pacific Justice Institute.
This study attempts to remove this subjectivity by applying the
following consistent classification scheme to ten categories of cases across
time: "conservative" votes are those that favor an assertion of
governmental power, while "liberal" votes are those that favor a claim of
individual liberty. 3  By tracking the term-to-term conservative or liberal
changes in the voting patterns of individual Justices and the Court as a
whole across these categories of cases,4 and by applying standard statistical
tests to the resulting data,5 this Study attempts to provide reliable
information regarding the current ideological posture of the Court and its
members, as well as conclusions and projections regarding its past and
future trends. Whether any statistical study of process as complex as
judicial decision-making can be reliable is, of course, open to debate.6 But,
within the limitations inherent in an attempt to "number crunch" ideology,
this annual survey offers students and practitioners information that is
useful for assessing how the Court or an individual Justice has voted-and
may vote in the future-in particular types of cases.
This Term's survey shows overall conservative movement for the
Court as a whole, reversing last Term's slight liberal voting trend. The
"Majority" decisions in seven of the ten categories (Civil Federal Party,
Civil State Party, Criminal Federal Party, Criminal State Party, Federalism,
Statutory Civil Rights, and Swing-vote) indicate varying degrees of
3. There is no single, settled definition of conservatism or liberalism. See generally M.A.
RIFF, DICTIONARY OF MODERN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 67-73, 141-52 (1987) (discussing various
possible interpretations of the terms). This Study's definitions, however, are close to the core
ideals of each ideology. See id. at 67 (noting that conservatism "implies fear of sudden and
violent change[s], respect for established institutions and rulers, support for elites and hierarchies
and a general mistrust of theory as opposed to empirical deductions"); see also id. at 142
(asserting that "twentieth century" liberalism is "compounded of constitutionalism; doubtful[] of
pluralism; certain[] of a belief in the virtues of economic freedom, and less certain[] of a desire to
restrict government intervention in most other aspects of life").
4. See infra Data Tables 1-10.
5. See infra Appendix B.
6. The general reliability of statistical inference depends on random sampling. See
generally ROBERT V. HOGG & ALLEN T. CRAIG, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL
STATISTICS 157-58 (5th ed. 1994); RAYMOND H. MYERS, CLASSICAL AND MODERN
REGRESSION WITH APPLICATIONS 9-11 (2d ed. 1990). The Court's method of selecting cases is
far from random. Rather, it is the result of a conscious decisional process. Furthermore, reliable
statistics generally require large quantities of information to produce reliable results. As sample
sizes become larger, inferences become more accurate. This Study is subject to sampling bias,
both because the sample is not random and because it is comparatively small. The statistical
inferences below, therefore, may not accurately represent a Justice's (or the Court's) views.
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conservative movement. For example, the voting results from the Civil
State Party category, the Study's most reliable category for predictions of
ideological voting behavior,7 reveal an increase in the Court's support of
the state government. 8 Similarly, the Court showed increased support of
the federal government in criminal cases, voting for the government
100.0% of the time.9 However, even though the Court showed overall
conservative movement this Term, there was still some increased liberal
support in certain categories. When voting on First Amendment issues, the
Court voted "liberally" in both its "Majority" and "Split" decisions.' 0 The
Court also voted "liberally" in cases raising a challenge to the exercise of
federal jurisdiction." Indeed, in both the "Majority" and "Unanimous"
jurisdiction decisions the Court voted "liberally" or for the claim to expand
its jurisdiction. Interestingly, a "conservative" Court is voting "liberally"
on jurisdiction to increase its own power.'
2
Of the categories that showed conservative movement (Civil Federal
Party, Civil/State Party, Criminal Federal Party, Criminal State Party,
Federalism, Statutory Civil Rights, and Swing-vote), the statistics from the
Swing-vote and Civil/State Party are significant. The statistics from the
Swing-vote categories indicate that in close, ideologically charged cases,
the Court voted conservatively 68.0% of the time. 13 The conservative
movement of the Court in the Civil/State Party, as noted above, is
particularly significant because it is the most accurate predictor of the
Court's ideology this Term. 14 In fact, of the top five predictors of ideology
(Civil/State, Criminal State, Criminal Federal, Federalism, and Jurisdiction)
the Court voted "conservatively" in all but one category. 5
The anticipated voting scores for the 2001 Term varied by category
with a broad range of results. Some categories, such as Civil State, Civil
Federal and Criminal State, were fairly accurate predictors of how the
Justices actually voted.' 6 The most accurate predictor of anticipated voting
behavior was Criminal State, in which the average difference between
anticipated and actual scores in this category was 8.37 percentage points
7. See infra Part V.
8. See infra Data Table 3.
9. See infra Data Table 4.
10. See infra Data Table 5.
11. See infra Data Table 8.
12. See infra Data Table 8.
13. See infra Data Table 10.
14. See infra Part V.
15. See infra Data Tables 1-5.
16. See infra Data Tables 1-3.
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per Justice.17 The anticipated scores in the Criminal Federal category
differed most from the Justices' actual scores, deviating by an average of
46.8 percentage points per Justice.' 8  However, the great difference
between the anticipated and actual scores in Criminal Federal could be due
to the fact that the Court quite unexpectedly voted 100.0% of the time in
favor of the federal government in "Majority," "Split," and "Unanimous"
cases. 19
This Study's anticipated scores for "Majority" decisions were much
more inaccurate than last year's predictions.2 ° In the Criminal Federal
category, for example, the anticipated and actual scores for "Majority"
decisions differed by as much as 80.4 points, while the most accurate
category for "Majority" decisions was Civil/State at 10.8 points. With
regard to the accuracy of anticipated scores for individual Justices, Justice
Thomas's anticipated scores were closest to his actual scores, differing by
an average of only 9.3 points in each category. However, the anticipated
scores for Justice Breyer deviated most from his actual scores by 24.15
points.
Category analysis, introduced in the 1996 Study and included in the
Study again this Term, indicates that the categories of Civil/State,1
Criminal State,22 Criminal Federal,23 Federalism, 24 and Jurisdiction25 are
the best indicators of the conservative/liberal predilections of the Justices.
The remaining categories, First Amendment,26 Statutory Civil Rights,27
Civil Federal, 28 and Equal Protection 29 are relatively poor indicators of the
Justices' voting propensities.
30
Frontier analysis this Term revealed a few interesting changes. Chief
Justice Rehnquist moved into the top spot on the "Conservative Frontier"
with a super efficient score of 108.0%, displacing Justice Scalia as the most
17. See infra Data Table 3.
18. See infra Data Table 4.
19. See infra Data Table 4.
20. See 2000 Study, supra note 1, at 250.
21. See infra Data Table 1.
22. See infra Data Table 3.
23. See infra Data Table 4.
24. See infra Data Table 9.
25. See infra Data Table 8.
26. See infra Data Table 5.
27. See infra Data Table 7.
28. See infra Data Table 2.
29. See infra Data Table 6.
30. See infra Part V.
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conservative Justice this Term. 31 Justice Thomas took the second spot on
the "Conservative Frontier" with a score of 103.0%, followed by Justice
Scalia in third at 101.0%.32 On the other end of the spectrum, Justice
Stevens took the top spot on the "Liberal Frontier" with a score of
11 7.0%.33 Justice Stevens was the only Justice on the "Liberal Frontier" to
record a super efficient score above 100.0%.1
4
This Study is divided into sections to make the information more
accessible to the reader. The precise details of the statistical analysis-as
can be gleaned from a glance at the equations and explanations in
Appendix B-are hardly the topic of light cocktail conversations.
However, one need not have an advanced degree in mathematics to
understand the general trends that flow from the Study's analysis. Part II
gives a description of the mode of analysis employed by the Study. Part III
follows with a general overview of this Term's findings. Part IV sets out
the Study's numerical tables, graphs, and statistical charts and discusses-
table by table and chart by chart-the information contained therein. Parts
V and VI describe the methodology and outcome of this year's Category
and Frontier analyses, respectively. Appendices A and B detail the
definitions and statistical tests employed by this Study.
II. Mode of Analysis
This Study is based on the tabulation and mathematical analysis of
each Justice's votes in ten categories. Nine of the categories are based on
the nature of the issues addressed (e.g., First Amendment and Equal
Protection) or on the character of the parties involved (e.g., state or federal
government litigants).35 The tenth category tabulates the number of times
each Justice voted with the "majority" in cases decided by a single, or
swing, vote.
The first nine categories are designed to detect each Justice's attitude
toward two broad issues underlying most Supreme Court decisions: the
protection of individual rights and judicial restraint. The tabulation of
31. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 1; see also 2000 Study, supra note 1, at 251.
32. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 1.
33. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 2.
34. See infra Frontier Analysis Table 2.
35. The categories are as follows: (1) civil controversies in which a state or one of its
officials or political subdivisions is opposed by a private party; (2) civil controversies in which
the federal government or one of its agencies or officials is opposed by a private party; (3) state
criminal cases; (4) federal criminal cases; (5) First Amendment issues of freedom of speech,
press, religion, and association; (6) Equal Protection claims; (7) statutory civil rights claims; (8)
issues of federal court jurisdiction, party standing, justiciability, and related matters; and (9)
federalism cases.
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votes in each category reveals, in broad strokes, the frequency with which
individual Justices and the Court as a whole vote to protect individual
rights36 or to exercise judicial restraint.37
From the voting patterns that emerge, the Study determines whether
individual Justices and the Court are taking "conservative" or "liberal"
positions. The Study classifies outcomes that favor an assertion of
government power as conservative and outcomes that favor a claim of
individual rights as liberal. Accordingly, the Study classifies as
conservative a vote for the government against an individual, a vote against
a claim of constitutional or statutory rights, a vote against the exercise of
federal jurisdiction, or a vote favoring state (as opposed to federal)
authority on federalism questions. The Study classifies all contrary votes
as liberal.
This analytical scheme is not perfect. Unanimous decisions, which
constitute a significant portion of all cases decided by the Court, are
included in the Study's calculations even though liberal or conservative
ideology may not have influenced the outcome of such cases. Unanimous
opinions often result when either the law or the facts, or both, point so
clearly in one direction that ideology is not a decisional factor.
Furthermore, concern for individual rights is not always, or even
necessarily, the attitudinal opposite of judicial restraint.
Despite the difficulties with our classification scheme, the basic
assumption that supports this Study-that the general orientation of
36. Votes implicating individual rights are tabulated in tables reporting the outcome of state
and federal criminal prosecutions (Tables 3 and 4), as well as those detailing the resolution of
claims based on the First Amendment (Table 5), the Equal Protection Clause (Table 6), and civil
rights statutes (Table 7). The civil cases examined in Data Tables I and 2 also involve individual
rights, as these suits pit the government against persons asserting private rights. The federalism
decisions tabulated in Table 9 are less obviously relevant to individual rights because such
decisions focus on the balance of federal and state authority. Nevertheless, in such cases, the
practical effect of voting for the state is to deny federal relief to a party alleging state
encroachment upon his or her rights.
37. Jurisdictional questions (Table 8), which exhibit the relative propensity of the Justices to
avoid judicial decisions, are perhaps the most direct statistical evidence of judicial restraint.
Other tables included in the Study, however, also provide some indication of the individual
Justices' (and the Court's) positions on the "judicial restraint/judicial activism" axis. Judicial
restraint is normally identified with deference to the policy-making branches of government,
adherence to precedent, avoidance of constitutional bases of decision when narrower grounds
exist, respect for the Framers' intent when construing constitutional text, and avoidance of issues
rendered unnecessary by the doctrines of ripeness, mootness, political questions, etc. As a result,
a vote in favor of individual rights claims (Tables 1-7) may provide some indication of "judicial
activism" because judicial recognition of individual rights often requires the Court to overturn
precedent or invalidate an existing statute. Federalism issues (Table 9) are also relevant because
judicial restraint is traditionally identified with respect for the role of the states within the federal
system.
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individual Justices and the Court regarding individual rights and judicial
restraint is suggestive of conservative or liberal ideology-appears sound.38
For example, deference to legislatures frequently results in rejection of an
individual's claim, especially one predicated upon the impropriety of
governmental action.39 Judicial restraint is associated with a reluctance to
read new rights into the Constitution or statutes. 40  Refusal to exercise
federal jurisdiction leaves the matter to the state courts with their possible
bias in favor of state governmental action and is a clear rebuff to the
claimant seeking federal protection of rights.41 Therefore, to the extent that
the Study's basic ideological assumptions regarding liberal and
conservative outcomes are accurate, it is possible to identify trends by
tracking the voting patterns reflected in Data Tables 1 through 10.42
To determine current ideological positions within the Court, votes of
the individual Justices can be compared with those cast by other Justices
this Term, as well as with the outcomes for the 1992-2000 Terms.
Likewise, the current ideological position of the Court as a whole can be
determined by comparing present outcomes of the Court majority with
those of prior terms. In Data Tables 1-10, this information appears in the
form of voting percentages for each Justice and for the Court majority.
Charts 1-10, in turn, graphically depict the Court's voting trends revealed
in the tables.
Mean Tables 1-10 and Regression Tables 1-10 analyze the voting
patterns of the individual Justices. The purpose of these tables is to
determine whether a Justice's 2001 Term voting record departs in a
statistically significant manner from his or her prior voting pattern and
whether any significant correlation exists among the term-to-term voting
38. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. See also infra Part V.
39. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (holding that the statutory distinction in 8
U.S.C. § 1409, which imposes different requirements for a child's acquisition of U.S. citizenship
based on whether the mother or father is the citizen parent, is consistent with Equal Protection).
40. See id.
41. See, e.g., Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1998) (holding that claim
preclusion by reason of a prior federal judgment is a defensive plea that provides no ground for
removal from state to federal court).
42. Of course, the data are only as reliable as our assumptions. The general assumption that
a vote in favor of the government reflects conservative views may not be accurate in all cases.
For example, see Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), where the more
conservative members of the court voted in favor of a First Amendment claim. There, the state's
canon of judicial conduct prohibited candidates for judicial election from expressing their views
on certain First Amendment topics, such as abortion. The "conservative" Justices apparently
valued free speech more than continued expansion of the abortion right. This is not necessarily a
"conservative" outcome, however. Similarly, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001),
the more conservative members of the Court voted liberally against the state in order to reaffirm
the importance of economic rights, generally considered to be a conservative value.
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patterns of the Justices.
43
In order to calculate the anticipated voting scores of the Justices, we
use an Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) forecasting
model. 4 The ARIMA model is useful in situations where, as in this Study,
a single variable (a Justice's voting score) is forecast based only on its
present and prior values with no other explanatory variables.
In order to determine which categories best reveal the conservative
and liberal leanings of the Court, we apply factor analysis, which "tests"
the Justices' disposition of cases in the various categories. Factor analysis
has long been used by psychologists attempting to identify characteristics
of personality and intelligence.45 The results of the factor analysis for the
2001 Term appear in Part V of this article.
Finally, Frontier Analysis Tables 1-4 and Frontier Charts 1-4
compare the Justices' conservative and liberal predilections this Term and
over the course of the entire Study. Frontier analysis mitigates some of the
analytical difficulties previously discussed by measuring the strength of
each Justice's tendencies relative to the rest of the Court with respect to the
cases actually decided in a given Term rather than against any absolute
scale.46
All of the data and statistics must be interpreted with caution. The
percentages and statistical results revealed in each table are affected not
only by the dispositions of the individual Justices but also by the nature of
the cases decided each Term. Furthermore, Supreme Court cases are not
the result of random selection, and the universe of votes cast by the Justices
is relatively small. Since both the random sampling and large sample size
are crucial elements of any fully reliable statistical analysis, conclusions
drawn from this Study are not beyond dispute. There are obvious
limitations to any empirical analysis of a subjective decision-making
process.
47
In light of these caveats, one might ask whether this Study is worth
conducting or reading. We believe it is. For years, experienced Supreme
Court practitioners have attempted to divine the ideological predilections of
individual Justices in framing their arguments to the Court. Moreover, both
the media and academicians are fond of attaching ideological labels to the
Court and its personnel. Supreme Court practitioners, legal scholars, and
the public have long assumed that assessments of Court ideology are
43. See infra Appendix B.
44. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed explanation of ARIMA.
45. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed analysis of factor analysis.
46. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed analysis of frontier analysis.
47. See supra note 6.
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valuable, even though such assessments may be based upon little more than
the gut reactions of the attorneys, scholars, and news reporters involved.
This Study, based upon a systematic methodology for objectively
gathering, quantifying, and analyzing data over time, should be more
reliable than such ad hoc assessments.
III. Overview of the Ideological Trends of the 2001 Term
The results of this Term's survey suggest an overall conservative
movement after last Term's slight liberal voting trend. Seven of the ten
categories showed conservative movement in "Majority" decisions.
Specifically, the Court's support of the federal government in civil cases
jumped to an all time high of 100.0% after last Term's low of 28.6%. The
Court's most reliable category for indicating conservative/liberal trends,
Civil/State Party, showed conservative movement in all decided cases.
Finally, in "Swing-vote" decisions, perhaps the best indicator of the
ideological leaning of the Court, the results show that in cases decided by
one vote the Court voted conservatively 68.0% of the time.
Data Table 1: Civil Cases - State Government versus a Private Party.
This Term, the Court continued its conservative trend in this category.
This category is our most reliable indicator of the conservative/liberal split
and the Justices fall reliably into this classification. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas rank as the most conservative Justices, and
Justice Stevens holds the most liberal position. The anticipated voting
scores were generally very accurate this Term. Justice O'Connor's
anticipated score was only off by 0.6 points from her actual score. Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg continue to have a strong voting correlation. In this
category, we predict, again, that Justice Thomas will be the most
conservative Justice next Term and Justice Stevens again will be the most
liberal.
Data Table 2: Civil Cases - Federal Government versus a Private Party.
This Term, the Court's treatment of the federal government in civil
cases moved in a conservative direction, which broke from the liberal trend
that it has been following in recent years. In all three categories,
"Majority," "Unanimous," and "Split," the Court voted conservatively.
However, it is difficult to draw many conclusions about the Court's
behavior in this category as only two of the Justices' voting patterns
showed a statistically significant change, and that change was in a liberal
direction. Furthermore, as a result of the unusual conservative support for
the federal government this Term, this category ranks eighth in our factor
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
analysis, suggesting that it is a poor indicator of conservative/liberal bias.
Data Table 3: Criminal Cases - State Government versus a Private Party.
The Court's voting record in state criminal cases indicates a divided
court. The Court voted in favor of the government 50.0% of the time in
"Majority" decisions but only 40.0% of the time in "Split" cases.
Additionally, the top four Justices voted in favor of the state over 75.0% of
the time, while the bottom four Justices supported the state less than 30.0%
of the time. Only two Justices had voting records that were not statistically
significant, suggesting significant instability in voting patterns this Term.'
Data Table 4: Criminal Cases - Federal Government versus a Private
Party.
The Court reversed the liberal voting pattern of last Term with a
100.0% voting record in favor of the federal government. In all three
categories - "Majority," "Split," and "Unanimous" - the Court voted in
favor of the government. Five of the nine Justices voted 100.0% in favor
of the federal government in all of the cases before the Court, and the
remaining Justices still voted in support of the federal government more
than 50.0% of the time. The Justices' support for the federal government
was quite unexpected, as evidenced by the anticipated scores, which were
highly inaccurate.
Data Table 5: First Amendment Rights of Expression, Association, and
Religion.
Data Table 5 demonstrates that, although the Court moved in a
slightly "conservative" manner overall, the Court still votes "liberally" on
First Amendment claims. The anticipated scores for the Justices in the
category were largely inaccurate. This inaccuracy may indicate that the
Court is being driven more by political ideology, in this category, than any
commitment to a consistent First Amendment theory. Only one of the
Justices had a statistically significant change in voting behavior.
Data Table 6: Equal Protection Claims.
This Term the Court decided no cases involving a claim of Equal
Protection. With the Court not deciding any cases regarding Equal
Protection, we can say very little about conservative/liberal bias except to
say that the Court, historically, has taken few cases involving a claim of
Equal Protection.
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Data Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights Claims.
The Court returned to its conservative trend in this category, after last
Term's slight liberal movement. The anticipated scores predicted more
liberal movement than was actually exhibited. There is a great deal of
volatility in this category, as demonstrated by seven of the nine Justices
showing statistically significant changes in their voting behavior. Justices
Stevens and Breyer tended to vote similarly in this category, as did Justices
Souter and Ginsburg.
Data Table 8: Cases Raising a Challenge to the Exercise of Federal
Jurisdiction.
This Term, the Court returned to its liberal trend in federal jurisdiction
cases, after its slight conservative movement last Term. The Court's
movement in the "Majority" and "Unanimous" decisions was liberal, while
the "Split" decisions were slightly more conservative. This Term, six out
of the nine Justices showed a statistically significant change in voting
behavior. Even though the Court's behavior shifted this Term, the
anticipated scores were not too far off. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer
shared the highest correlation scores.
Data Table 9: Federalism Cases.
Again, we see the classic conservative/liberal split with the
traditionally "conservative" Justices at the top of the rankings and the
"liberal" Justices at the bottom. The voting behavior this Term was slightly
more conservative than last Term. The "Split" decisions moved almost
thirteen percentage points in favor of the state. However, the "Unanimous"
decisions moved almost seven percentage points more liberally. Justices
Kennedy and Thomas voted the most in favor of states' rights, and Justices
Stevens, Souter and Breyer voted the most against states' rights. Justices
Souter and Breyer showed the highest correlation in voting behavior in this
category with a score of 0.95 and an R2 of 0.89.
318 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 30:3
Data Table 10: Swing-vote Cases.
The Court's voting record in cases that were decided by one vote
continued its conservative trend this Term. Justice O'Connor regained the
position as the Justice most likely to vote with the majority in cases decided
by one vote, voting with the majority 84.0% of the time. Justice Ginsburg
claims the position as the Justice least likely to vote with the majority as
she voted only 20.0% of the time with the majority. The Court appears to
still be largely polarized: five of the Justices voted with the majority
roughly 75.0% of the time while the other four Justices voted with the
majority less than 30.0% of the time.
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IV. Analysis
Data Table 1: Civil Cases - State Government versus a Private Party.
Data Table 1 shows that the Court continued last Term's conservative
trend in "Majority" and "Split" decisions.48 The Court also voted more
conservatively in the "Unanimous" category this Term. The Court's scores
this Term in "Majority," "Split," and "Unanimous" decisions were 68.8%,
70.0%, and 66.7%, respectively.49
The Civil/State Party is our most reliable indicator of
conservative/liberal leanings. The rank order of Justices shows the classic
conservative/liberal split with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas topping the chart as the most
conservative, and with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
finishing as the most liberal. 50 Not surprisingly, Justice Stevens moved
back to the position of most liberal Justice, a position he has held five out
of the last six years. Justice O'Connor predictably ranked in the middle.
Justice Breyer moved from the most liberal Justice last year to fourth most
liberal Justice this year.52 He voted for the state 35.7% of the time last
Term and 50.0% this year.53 Chief Justice Rehnquist shared his position as
the most conservative Justice this year with Justice Thomas, both voting in
favor of the state 75.0% of the time.
54
Mean Table 1 indicates that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy, Thomas and Ginsburg all showed a statistically significant
change in voting behavior and all voted higher than their mean statistical
score for all prior Terms.55 Justice Kennedy scored 68.75 points, a notable
48. Civil cases decided in favor of the state government: Bd. ofEduc. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822
(2002); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); City of Columbus v. Ours Garage &
Wrecker Serv., 536 U.S. 424 (2002); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002); City of Los
Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., v. Tahoe
Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533
(2002); Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473 (2002); Owasso Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426 (2002); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002); Thomas v.
Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002). Cases decided against the state government: Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton,
536 U.S. 150 (2002); Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635 (2002); Lapides v.
Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002).
49. See infra Data Table 1.
50. See infra Data Table 1.
51. See infra Data Table 1.
52. See infra Data Table 1.
53. See infra Data Table 1.
54. See infra Data Table I.
55. See infra Mean Table 1.
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16.95 points higher than his statistical mean score last Term.56 Chief
Justice Rehnquist scored 75 points, 8.7 points higher than last Term, Justice
Ginsburg was 6.5 points higher than last Term, with a score of 50.0 points,
and Justice Thomas jumped 15.6 points with a score of 75 points.57 These
statistically significant movements suggest that the conservative pattern for
these Justices-and the Court as a whole-is indeed notable. Similar to the
2000 Term, Justices Ginsburg and Stevens had a voting correlation of 0.95
and an R2 score of 0.88. This means that, over time, the voting behavior
of these two Justices in Civil/State Party cases has moved in tandem.
The anticipated scores in this category did not show much error.59
The anticipated score of Justice O'Connor was almost exact, with an error
of only 0.6 points. 60 Justice Ginsburg was the next most accurate, with a
61small error of 2.2. Justices Kennedy and Thomas both voted more
conservatively than expected, with an error of 15.3 and 21.7 percentage
points, respectively. 62  For the 2002 Term, we anticipate that Justice
Thomas will be the most conservative Justice and that Justice Stevens will
be the most liberal.63
Data Table 2: Civil Cases - Federal Government versus a Private Party.
The Court's voting behavior for Data Table 2 this Term is
conservative.64  The Court showed conservative movement in its
56. See infra Mean Table 1.
57. See infra Mean Table 1.
58. See infra Regression Table 1.
59. See infra Data Table 1.
60. See infra Data Table 1.
61. See infra Data Table 1.
62. See infra Data Table 1.
63. See infra Data Table I.
64. Civil cases decided in favor of the federal government: United States v. Fior D'Italia,
536 U.S. 238 (2002); SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002); Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635 (2002); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); Verizon
Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002); United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002);
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002); Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125
(2002); Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106 (2002); Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43
(2002); Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002); EEOC v.
Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002); Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling Inc., 534 U.S. 235
(2002); Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002); Chickasaw Nation v. United States,
534 U.S. 84 (2001); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1 (2001). Cases decided against the
federal government: BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002); Franconia Assocs. v.
United States, 536 U.S. 129 (2002); Gisbrecht v. Bamhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002); Thompson v. W.
States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002); Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137
(2002); Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
535 U.S. 234 (2002).
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"Majority," "Unanimous," and "Split" decisions.65 In fact, this Term's
support for the federal government is the highest since 1995.66 However,
although the Court as a whole has shown increased support for the federal
government in this category, we can say very little about the individual
ideologies of the Justices, as this category ranks eighth in our factor
analysis for predicting conservative/liberal bias.
Indeed, the data support, for example, the conclusion-confirmed by
factor analysis-that this category is a poor indicator of
conservative/liberal bias. This Term, the three most conservative Justices
are Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer,67 and the
three most liberal Justices are Justices Scalia, Souter, and Thomas.68
Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Kennedy occupy the middle positions.69
This is quite different from last Term, when Justice Stevens was the most
"conservative" Justice, with Justice Kennedy being the most "liberal. 7 °
Obviously there is quite a bit of movement from this Term to last,
indicating that this category is probably driven more by other factors than a
theory of generally supporting the federal government in Civil Party cases.
This Term, only Justices Stevens and Souter showed statistically
significant changes in their voting behavior.7' With the exception of
Justice Thomas, Justices Stevens and Souter were also the only two
Justices to move in a liberal direction.72
The anticipated scores for this Term confirm our earlier observation
that this category is a poor indicator of conservative/liberal bias. Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg had the largest errors
associated with their anticipated votes, and all of these Justices were
predicted to vote much more liberally than their actual 2001 scores.73
However, other than Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and
Ginsburg, the anticipated scores for the remaining Justices were all within
ten points of their predicted values.74
65. See infra Data Table 2.
66. See 1995 Study, supra note 1.
67. See infra Data Table 2.
68. See infra Data Table 2.
69. See infra Data Table 2.
70. See 2000 Study, supra note 1, at 264.
71. See infra Mean Table 2.
72. See id.
73. See infra Data Table 2.
74. See infra Data Table 2.
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Data Table 3: Criminal Cases - State Government versus a Private Party.
This Term the Court exhibited the same level of support for the states
in criminal cases 75 as last Term.76 Overall, however, the Court seems very
divided in its support for the states as it voted for the states 50.0% of the
time in "Majority" cases, 40.0% in "Split" cases, and 75.0% in
"Unanimous" cases.77 With such a variety of results in the decision of state
cases, the "Split" category is often the best indicator of conservative/liberal
ideology, and this Term shows the Court voting liberally in 40.0% of the
"Split" cases. 7 8 As the Criminal State category is the second best indicator
of the Justices' individual predilections, the liberal movement in the "Split"
category suggests the existence of a liberal voting bloc within the Court
that, while successful only 40.0% of the time, nevertheless exerts
substantial "drag" on the otherwise conservative momentum of the Court.
The ordering of the Justices was consistent with the classic ideological
organization of the Court.79 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and Thomas recorded the highest score in this category, finding for the
states 84.6% of the time. 80 Justice Kennedy followed the top three and
voted for the state 76.9% of the time. 81  Justice O'Connor followed
Kennedy and voted for the state 46.2% of the time, with Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer voting for the state 30.8%, 23.1%, 23.1%,
and 15.4% of the time, respectively.82 It thus appears that the Court is quite
fragmented, with a difference of nearly 30 points between the top four
Justices and the bottom five.83 Justice O'Connor appears to be the key
swing vote that determines the current ideology of the Court in this
category.
Seven of the nine Justices showed a statistically significant movement
75. Criminal cases decided in favor of state governments: Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856
(2002); Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266 (2002); McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002); Bell v. Cone,
535 U.S. 685 (2002); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516
(2002). Cases decided against state governments: Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635 (2002); Ring
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Carey v. Saffold, 536
U.S. 214 (2002); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002); Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002);
Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246 (2002).
76. See infra Data Table 3.
77. See infra Data Table 3.





83. See infra Data Table 3.
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in voting ideology; only Justices Thomas and Breyer did not.84  This
statistical significance could be an important sign that the conservative and
liberal wings of the Court are continuing to move in polar opposite
directions. No Justice displayed a reliable voting correlation pattern.85
In spite of the Court's increased polarization this Term, the category
was quite accurate in predicting the Court's voting behavior.86  All the
Justices were predicted within 15 points of their actual scores.87 The Study
anticipates that next Term the Court will continue a slight liberal trend.88
Data Table 4: Criminal Cases - Federal Government versus a Private
Party.
In all three categories, the Court this Term voted 100.0% in favor of
the federal government. 89 This is quite a different outcome from last Term,
where the Court voted in "Majority" decisions only 28.6% of the time in
favor of the federal government.9" In fact, this Term, the full Court voted
for the federal government more than 60.0% of the time, 9' with five of the
nine Justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
Scalia, and Breyer) voting 100.0% for the federal government in all the
cases this Term.92 This category is also the third most reliable indicator,
according to our factor analysis, of conservative/liberal bias. But, with a
small sample of cases, it is difficult to draw conclusions about long-term
changes in ideological attitudes.
Nevertheless, the strong conservative movement this Term seems
noteworthy because all of the Justices showed a statistically significant
change in voting behavior.93 Moreover, this significant change in voting
behavior was unpredicted, with all the Justices' anticipated scores off by at
84. See infra Mean Table 3.
85. See infra Regression Table 3.
86. See infra Data Table 3.
87. See infra Data Table 3.
88. See infra Data Table 3.
89. Criminal cases decided for the federal government: United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862
(2002); United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002);
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002); United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002);
United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55 (2002); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2001); United
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2002). No cases in the criminal category were decided against
the federal government this term.
90. See 2000 Study, supra note 1, at 272.
91. See infra Data Table 4.
92. See infra Data Table 4.
93. See infra Mean Table 4.
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least 19.2 points (Thomas) and as much as 81.9 points (Breyer).94 With the
Justices' anticipated scores being so far off their predicted values, the
Court's support for the federal government may indeed be noteworthy.
Still, as noted above, the small sample of cases could be the reason for the
large errors in the anticipated scores.
As with last Term, the strongest correlation in voting behavior was
between Justices Souter and Ginsburg.95 They had a voting correlation of
0.97.96 For next year, the Study anticipates that the Court will fall off its
pace of 100.0% support for the federal government but will be more
conservative than the 2000 Term.
97
Data Table 5: First Amendment Rights of Expression, Association, and
Religion.
The Court this Term showed a slight conservative movement in its
support for First Amendment claims but still voted liberally overall.98 The
Court voted in favor of First Amendment claims 66.7% of the time in
"Majority" cases, 71.4% in "Split" cases, and 50.0% in "Unanimous"
cases.99 Factor analysis, however, shows that First Amendment claims are
only the sixth most reliable indicator of conservative/liberal bias.
The ranking of the Justices bears out the factor analysis results, with
Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Thomas, and Souter occupying the top
positions, followed by Justices O'Connor, Breyer, and Ginsburg, with
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist taking the last two positions,
respectively. 100 This unusual ranking, with a usually conservative Justice at
the top of the chart (Kennedy), and a usually liberal Justice near the
conservative bottom (Ginsburg), supports the factor analysis conclusion
that this category produces variable (and therefore perhaps less reliable)
results.
With the small sample of cases for First Amendment claims, it is
difficult to draw many conclusions. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note
94. See infra Data Table 4.
95. See infra Regression Table 4.
96. See infra Regression Table 4.
97. See infra Data Table 4.
98. First Amendment cases for the claim: Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S.
765 (2002); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150
(2002); Thompson v. W. State Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002); Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002). First Amendment cases against the claim: Ashcroft v. ACLU,
535 U.S. 564 (2002); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002); Thomas
v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002).
99. See infra Data Table 5.
100. See infra Data Table 5.
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that Justice Kennedy remains in the top group for support of First
Amendment claims, while Justice Breyer fell from the top group to second
position.'0 l Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia remained in last
position, just as they did last Term.
10 2
Although Justices Scalia and Thomas do not occupy the same
positions in the above-mentioned groupings, they did show a significant
voting correlation with each other, as did Justices Stevens and Ginsburg.1
0 3
Justice O'Connor, however, was the only Justice to have a statistically
significant change in voting behavior, voting more liberally this Term than
last. 10 4  Significant changes in Justice O'Connor's voting behavior are
always of interest, as she occupies a critical swing-vote position on the
Court.105
The Court's anticipated scores were largely inaccurate, with the
exception of Justice Souter, who was within 3.8 points of his predicted
value. 10 6 Given the small sample of cases that the Court takes on First
Amendment claims each year, it is not surprising that there were large
errors in the predicted scores. But, it is still interesting to note that six of
the nine Justices were more liberal than predicted.
0 7
The unpredictability in the ideology of the Court could be indicative
of the fact that the Court in this area is driven more by political ideology
than consistent First Amendment theory. For example, in one particular
case this Term, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the conservative
Justices seemed unusually committed to expanding free speech, while the
liberal Justices seemed to take issue, politically, with a state judge running
for election and expressing his opinion about abortion. 108
Data Table 6: Equal Protection Claims.
The Court took no cases with Equal Protection claims; accordingly,
we cannot form any real opinions about ideological voting behavior or
conservative/liberal bias. It is not unusual for the Court to take a small
number of Equal Protection cases. Last Term, the Court heard only four
cases that raised a claim of Equal Protection.'
0 9
101. See infra Data Table 5.
102. See infra Data Table 5.
103. See infra Regression Table 5.
104. See infra Mean Table 5.
105. See infra Data Table 10.
106. See infra Data Table 5.
107. See infra Data Table 5.
108. See 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
109. See 2000 Study, supra note 1, at 306.
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Data Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights Claim.
Consistent with prior Terms, the data seem to indicate conservative
movement in this category. Indeed, the only exception to this trend came
last Term, where the Court showed some slight liberal movement. 1 0 This
Term, however, the Court returned to its past conservative pattern with
almost every Justice voting more conservatively. The "Majority" decisions
moved conservatively from 33.3% last Term to 26.7% this Term."'
The anticipated scores predicted more liberal voting.' Specifically,
both Justice Stevens' and Justice Souter's votes were a surprise with scores
of 35.2 points and 31.8 points, respectively, and were more conservative
than anticipated." 1
3
There is a great deal of volatility in the Court in this category of cases.
Mean Table 7 indicates that all the Justices, except Justices Thomas and
Souter, showed a statistically significant change in voting behavior.'
Instability in this category is not surprising. Last Term, all but two of the
Justices showed a statistically significant change in voting behavior." 5
The rank order of the Justices shows a sharp division between the
conservative and liberal votes. Take, for example, Justices Breyer and
O'Connor, who hold the fourth and fifth places on Table 7 this Term.
Justice Breyer, one of the reliably liberal Justices according to our frontier
analysis, voted for the claim eight times and against it seven times. On the
other hand, Justice O'Connor, just one place below Justice Breyer on Table
7 and a notable conservative swing voter, voted for the claim four times
and against it eleven times." 6 This division reflects the profound
conservative/liberal split of the current Court.
Justice Stevens' and Justice Breyer's voting patterns tend to move
similarly over time on statutory civil rights claims, with a correlation of
110. Cases decided in favor of the Statutory Civil Rights claims: Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002); Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106 (2002);
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279
(2002). Cases decided against the Statutory Civil Rights claims: Christopher v. Harbury, 536
U.S. 403 (2002); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181
(2002); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002); McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24
(2002); U.S. Airways, Inc., v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide,
Inc., 535 U.S. 81 (2002); Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 (2002); Toyota
Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61
(2002). See also infra Data Table 7.
111. See infra Data Table 7.
112. See infra Data Table 7.
113. See infra Data Table 7.
114. See infra Mean Table 7.
115. See 2000 Study, supra note 1, at 286 (Mean Table 7).
116. See infra Data Table 7.
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0.99 and an R2 of 0.97.'17 Justices Souter and Ginsburg demonstrate a
weaker, but possibly significant, relationship. The data this Term show
that their voting patterns have a correlation of 0.96 and an R
2 of 0.91.118
Next year, we anticipate Justices Stevens and Breyer to vote the most
liberally and Justice Thomas to vote the most conservatively in this
category. 119
Data Table 8: Cases Raising a Challenge to the Exercise of Federal
Jurisdiction.
This Term, the Court returned to its liberal trend in federal jurisdiction
cases, after its slight conservative movement last Term. Every Justice,
excluding Justice Kennedy, voted more liberally this Term. 20 This
significant liberal move may be an indicator of the Court's willingness to
expand its power. The "Majority" and "Unanimous" decisions show the
Court's liberal movement. However, the "Split" decisions are slightly
more conservative. 121
Justice Stevens topped the chart as the most liberal Justice for the
fourth year in a row. Justice O'Connor, who voted most conservatively last
Term, ranked fourth most conservative this Term. Justice Scalia voted the
most conservatively this Term.
22
This Term, six out of the nine Justices showed a statistically
significant change in voting behavior. Justice Ginsburg's voting changed
the most, with her actual voting percentage this Term 46.53 points higher
than her mean voting percentage for all prior Terms. 123 Justice Breyer's
score increased 26.63 points, Justice Souter's 16.23 points, Justice Stevens'
15.23 points, and Chief Justice Rehnquist's 15.07 points. Finally, Justice
O'Connor's score increased 10.94 points.124  Justice Breyer and Justice
117. See infra Regression Table 7.
118. See infra Regression Table 7.
119. See infra Data Table 7.
120. Cases in favor of the exercise of federal jurisdiction: Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452
(2002); JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 536 U.S. 88 (2002);
Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002); Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635
(2002); Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.
506 (2002); Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426 (2002). Cases decided against the
exercise of federal jurisdiction: Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535
U.S. 826 (2002); Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Great-West
Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002); TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19
(2001).
121. See infra Data Table 8.
122. See infra Data Table 8.
123. See infra Mean Table 8.
124. See infra Mean Table 8.
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Ginsburg shared the highest correlation score of 0.98 and highest R2 score
of 0.96.121
Although the Court's voting behavior was more liberal this Term, the
anticipated scores were fairly accurate. 26 In fact, Justices Thomas and
Scalia only had margins of error of 3.0 and 3.6 points, respectively, while
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Breyer both had the largest margins of
error at 16.0 points. 127 Next Term, we anticipate that Justice Ginsburg will
be the most liberal Justice and that Justice Scalia will be the most
conservative Justice in this category. 1
28
Data Table 9: Federalism Cases.
Data Table 9 shows a slight conservative movement over last Term.
129
As compared to last Term, "Majority" decisions moved about seven
percentage points in favor of the state, a conservative move, while "Split"
decisions moved almost 13 percentage points in favor of the state. 3°
"Unanimous" decisions, however, decreased in support for the state by
seven percentage points, thus moving in a slightly liberal direction. Factor
analysis indicates that the Federalism category is the fourth best indicator
of conservative/liberal bias in voting.
The ranking of the Justices for this Term reveals a traditional
alignment of the Court. The top five Justices, who most often voted in
favor of the state, were Justices Kennedy, Thomas, O'Connor, Scalia, and
Chief Justice Rehnquist, respectively.' 3' These Justices are followed by
Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Breyer, and Souter.132 Justices Kennedy and
Thomas recorded the most conservative scores on Data Table 9, voting in
favor of states' rights in 70.1% of the federalism cases. 133 Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer recorded the most liberal scores, voting for the state
125. See infra Regression Table 8.
126. See infra Data Table 8.
127. See infra Data Table 8.
128. See infra Data Table 8.
129. Cases decided for the federal government: Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639
(2002); City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424 (2002); Rush
Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002); Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports
Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 (2002); Porter v.
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002). Cases decided against the federal government: Lapides v. Bd. of
Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002); Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S.
362 (2002).
130. See infra Data Table 9.
131. See infra Data Table 9.
132. See infra Data Table 9.
133. See infra Data Table 9.
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only 30.0% of the time.
134
Although four of the Justices showed a statistically significant change
in voting behavior this Term,' 35 overall this category showed little error
between the Court's anticipated and actual scores of "Majority" cases.
1 36
The 45.2% anticipated score for Majority cases was only 4.8 points more
liberal than the actual score of 50.0%.137 The anticipated score for Chief
Justice Rehnquist was only 1.4 points more conservative than his actual
score of 50.0%.138 Justice Thomas' anticipated score was only 3.2 points
more liberal than his actual score of 70.0%. 139 Two of the most liberal
Justices, Justice Souter and Justice Breyer, showed the highest level of
correlation with a score of 0.95 and an R2 of score of 0.89.14' The
Federalism voting patterns of these two Justices, therefore, move together
over time.
Next year we anticipate Justice Scalia to vote the most times in favor
of states' rights and Justice Souter to vote the most times against states'
rights.
141
Data Table 10: Swing-vote Cases.
Data Table 10 contains the voting scores from cases that were decided
by a margin of one vote.142 Because of the narrow voting margin, Swing-
vote cases may well be the most reliable indicator of the Court's position
on the conservative/liberal spectrum. 143 This Term, the Court reached a
134. See infra Data Table 9.
135. See infra Mean Table 9.
136. See infra Mean Table 9.
137. See infra Mean Table 9.
138. See infra Data Table 9.
139. See infra Data Table 9.
140. See infra Regression Table 10.
141. See infra Data Table 9.
142. Swing-vote cases reaching a conservative outcome: Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822
(2002); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545
(2002); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002); McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24
(2002); Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); City of Los Angeles v.
Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002); Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S.
81 (2002); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002); Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002); Corr. Servs.
Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001). Swing-vote cases reaching a liberal outcome: Republican
Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002); Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002);
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002); Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB,
535 U.S. 137 (2002); Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246 (2002).
143. We use factor analysis to gauge the relative value of the other nine tables in assessing
ideology. See supra Part V.
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conservative result in 63.0% of the Swing-vote cases. 14 4 This result is an
increase of eight points over last Term's score and continues a trend of
reaching conservative outcomes in cases decided by one vote.'45
This Term, Justice O'Connor was the Justice who voted most often
with the majority in cases decided by one vote, voting with the majority
84.0% of the time.1 46 Justice O'Connor's position atop the chart makes her
a closely watched Justice, as her vote often decides which way the Court
will swing in highly contested cases. Justice O'Connor was closely
followed by Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas, who all voted 80.0% of
the time with the majority.1 47 At the other end of the spectrum, Justices
Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg were the least likely to vote with the
majority, with Justice Ginsburg voting with the majority in only 20.0% of
the cases decided by one vote.148
The anticipated scores for the Justices were fairly accurate this Term.
Seven of the Justices' anticipated scores (Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, Stevens, Souter, and Breyer) were
within 15 points of their actual scores. 149  For next Term, the Study
anticipates that Justices Kennedy and O'Connor will be the Justices most
likely to vote with the majority in cases decided by one vote and that
Justices Ginsburg and Souter will be the least likely to vote with the
majority in such cases.1
50
This Term, only Justices Kennedy and Breyer did not show a
statistically significant change in voting behavior. 151 The fact that the other
Justices showed a statistically significant change in voting behavior, in a
conservative direction, could indicate that the Court is becoming slightly
more conservative. Despite this possibility, the Court remains deeply
polarized, with Justices O'Connor and Kennedy occupying critical swing-
vote positions. This Term, no Justices showed a voting pattern that had a
high degree of correlation.
5 2
144. See infra Data Table 10.
145. See infra Data Table 10.
146. See infra Data Table 10.
147. See infra Data Table 10.
148. See infra Data Table 10.
149. See infra Data Table 10.
150. See infra Data Table 10.
151. See infra Mean Table 10.
152. See infra Regression Table 10.
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V. Category Analysis
Beginning in the 1996 Term, we began to analyze the effectiveness of
this Study's categories in measuring liberal and conservative tendencies
and trends. As might be expected, some categories turn out to be more
reliable indicators than others.
Some categories, although tending to divide the Court into
liberal/conservative blocs, may "change polarity" depending on the specific
issues presented. For example, contrast the votes of generally liberal
leaning Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg in Hill v.
Colorado,153 with their votes in Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.154 In
Hill, the liberal bloc voted against a First Amendment claim that would
have struck down a mandated buffer zone between protesters and clients of
abortion clinics as unconstitutional. 155 On the other hand, in Los Angeles,
the same bloc voted in favor of a First Amendment claim that would have
struck down a city ordinance limiting the concentration of adult
entertainment businesses. 1
56
Other categories tend to be implicated in very few cases. The small
sample set for these categories results in highly volatile score movements
from term-to-term, because a single case may account for many percentage
points. This point is dramatically illustrated this Term in the Equal
Protection category, which included no cases at all. Even though a vote in
favor of an Equal Protection claim is considered to be "liberal" under this
Study, drawing a conclusion that this Term's score of 0% in this category
represents a "conservative" outcome would be wholly unwarranted. The
score simply reflects the fact that there were no cases at all in which an
Equal Protection claim could have received a supporting vote.
In order to determine which categories best differentiate between more
liberal and more conservative Justices, we have applied a statistical tool
known as factor analysis. 157 By applying this tool, we have determined that
a primary factor may be extracted from the Study's categories over the
entire life of the Study that accounts for more of the variance revealed by
the data on Tables 1 through 9 than any other factor. 51 We interpret this
factor as representing liberal/conservative bias because that is what this
Study purports to measure. The categories currently load onto this primary
153. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
154. 535 U.S. 425 (2002).
155. Hill, 530 U.S. at 735 (5-4) (Souter, O'Connor, Ginsburg, Breyer, J.J., concurring).
156. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 453 (Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, J.J., concurring).
157. For more information regarding factor analysis, see infra Appendix B.
158. We extract a single factor via principal components analysis and employ a QMAX
rotation to achieve this result.














According to this ranking, the Civil/State Party category appears to be
our most reliable differentiator of liberal/conservative leanings, while
Equal Protection is our poorest. A look at the data seems to confirm this
result. Note, for example, that Equal Protection this Term included no
cases at all and that this circumstance can inaccurately skew the
interpretation of the results in the manner described above. Moreover, the
ranking of Civil Federal Party cases as the next least reliable category also
makes sense. It stands to reason that liberal administrations will bring
different types of cases before the Court than will conservative
administrations and will garner the support of different Justices. For
example, Chief Justice Rehnquist's average score was 74.0% under
Republican Administrations prior to President Clinton, but that average fell
to 61.0% during the Clinton Administration. 159 On the other hand, Justice
Stevens averaged 51.0% under the Republicans and 60.0% under President
Clinton.16
0
Category analysis, in short, suggests that the most reliable indicator of
actual ideology are the data collected on Table 1 (Civil/State Party), with
Tables 3 (Criminal/State Party), 4 (Criminal/Federal Party), 9 (Federalism),
and 8 (Jurisdiction) providing the next most reliable data. Tables 5 (First
Amendment), 7 (Statutory Civil Rights), 2 (Civil/Federal Party) and 6
(Equal Protection) provide less reliable information.
159. See infra Data Table 2.
160. See infra Data Table 2. Also see the discussion of Table 2, supra Part IV.
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VI. Frontier Analysis
Attempting to quantify the magnitude of a Justice's liberal or
conservative tendencies and to identify trends in such tendencies over time
is challenging for a variety of reasons. One challenge already discussed is
that of choosing appropriate tests and assessing their validity. Another is
dealing with inconsistency in the nature of cases appealed to the Court
from one Term to the next and the Court's selection of which questions it
will decide. With varying parameters such as these, is there any
meaningful way to quantify, analyze, and compare the Justices'
inclinations? One potentially useful method is frontier analysis.'
6
1
Frontier analysis focuses on the Justices' relative scores rather than
their absolute scores. Boundaries, or "frontiers," are defined by the highest
and lowest scores in each category and each combination of categories.
Each Justice is then evaluated relative to the established frontier. By
adjusting the relative weights allocated to each category, the frontier can be
adjusted to reflect each category's reliability as determined by the factor
analysis previously described.
We present liberal and conservative frontier data for the Court in
Frontier Analysis Tables 1 - 4 above. Two versions of each frontier are
presented. In Tables 1 and 2 we constrain the weights applied to each
category according to the factor analysis hierarchy described above. 62 In
other words, weights are chosen for each Justice that produces the highest
frontier score for him or her, subject to the limitation that Equal Protection
cannot receive more weight than Civil/State Party, Civil/State Party cannot
receive more weight than Statutory Civil Rights, and so forth. Tables 3 and
4 apply no weighting constraints at all, choosing for each Justice those
weights that present him or her in the most conservative or liberal light
possible. Each table lists a "% of Frontier" score for each Justice. Justices
with a score of 100% reach the frontier by employing the category weight
distribution shown in the category columns. Scores less than 100%
indicate that the most conservative/liberal score the Justice could obtain
with optimal weighting places him or her in the indicated percentage of the
way toward the frontier. In some cases, an optimal combination of weights
may even place a Justice beyond the frontier. This condition is known as
"super-efficiency" and is noted in the charts when present.
Frontier Charts 1 and 2 show the constrained scores of each Justice
over the course of this Study in graphical form. Near the bottom of each
chart is an indication of new Justices replacing outgoing Justices on the
161. For more information regarding frontier analysis, see infra Appendix B.
162. See supra Part V.
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Court. Although former Justices' scores are not indicated, they contributed
to frontier determination during Terms in which they sat on the Court.
Frontier Charts 3 and 4 show each Justice's range of frontier scores
during the course of this Study. Those charts are easier to read than the
line graphs and give a clearer picture of the Justice's relative positions and
score ranges overall. They do not, however, show any trend information.
Frontier Chart 1 shows Chief Justice Rehnquist in his customary
position as the most conservative Justice and Justice Stevens in his
customary position as the least conservative. Frontier Chart 2 shows their
"most" and "least" positions reversed. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Thomas and Scalia are each "super-efficient" on the conservative chart this
Term, and Justice Stevens is the sole super-efficient Justice on the liberal
chart. This chart also provides continuing evidence that Justice Souter's
reputation as the "[S]tealth [J]ustice" is justified.1 63 Beginning his tenure
on the Court in 1990 with a liberal frontier score of just 53.0%, Justice
Souter has subsequently registered scores of 74.0%, 79.0%, 88.0%, 96.0%,
and 100.0% prior to backing off to 85.0% in the 1996 Term. His 1997
Term score indicated 147.0% super-efficiency! 164 This Term, he scored
second only to Justice Stevens on the liberal frontier.
Frontier Chart 3 shows that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas have all reached the conservative
frontier at some point during the Study. In fact, the Chief Justice only
dropped below it twice during the Study. Frontier Chart 4 clearly displays
Justice Stevens' super-efficient liberal tendencies. In fact, he so dominates
the liberal frontier that only three other Justices (Souter, Breyer, and
Ginsburg) have managed to touch the frontier.
VII. Conclusion
The Court's voting behavior during the 2001 Term reverses the
modest liberal trend of last Term with virtually across-the-board
conservative movement. The only categories in the Study not
demonstrating conservative movement are Table 6 (Equal Protection, with
no decided cases at all), and Tables 3 and 8. Table 3, involving state
criminal cases, showed some liberal movement in the outcome of "Split"
decisions, but the Table (considered as a whole) exhibited highly unstable
163. See e.g., Dick Lehr, A Step Toward the Left: Souter's Surprise Shift May Alter the High
Court, BOSTON GLOBE, July 1, 1993, at All (stating "[i]n his first term, he wrote so little he was
nicknamed the 'stealth justice.' Last term, he was lumped into a trio of moderate conservatives.
Now, in the term just ended, Supreme Court Justice David H. Souter is the surprise of most high-
court prognosticators for displaying increasingly liberal tendencies.")
164. See infra Frontier Analysis, Table 2.
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voting patterns by virtually all members of the Court. The importance of
the slight liberal movement on Table 3, therefore, is questionable. Table 8,
which demonstrates a clearer liberal trend in the decision of jurisdictional
issues, is interesting primarily for what it might suggest about an otherwise
conservative Court. The conservative Rehnquist Court-at least this
Term--displays notable liberal movement only with regard to jurisdictional
questions, thereby (possibly) opening federal courts to a broader array of
issues to be decided by an otherwise conservative Court. But, while this
hypothesis complies with the data, it should not be posited too strenuously.
The data are too tenuous to "prove" (or, perhaps, even strongly suggest)
that a conservative voting bloc within the Rehnquist Court perceives itself
as a "Court with a mission."
What is clear is that polarization and voting instability on the Court
are increasing. Decisions in state criminal cases and First Amendment
cases demonstrate particularly unstable voting patterns. Voting patterns in
State Criminal, First Amendment, and Swing Vote cases, moreover,
demonstrate a high degree of polarity between the "conservative" and
"liberal" wings of the Court. The same ideological division of the Court
(although to a somewhat lesser degree) is also apparent on Tables 1 (State
Civil cases), 4 (Federal Criminal cases), 7 (Statutory Civil rights), and 9
(Federalism cases). Table 10, which tabulates the outcome of cases
decided by a single vote, similarly shows clear bloc voting, with Justice
O'Connor as the single most important vote in closely divided cases,
followed closely by Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas (who all
displayed identical voting patterns this Term). Last Term, we noted that
the liberal bloc appeared to be "gaining ground in... closely divided
cases." 165 Any such ground was unequivocally lost this Term.
165. See 2000 Study, supra note 1, at 326.
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All of this strengthens the conclusion, made last year, that "the present
Court stands in an uneasy ideological balance."'' 66 Last Term, it was
difficult "to know with certainty from the data whether the Court is more or
less conservative (or liberal) in 2000 than it was in 1999.,, 167 The same is
not true this Term. The conservative movement of the Court in 2001 is
clear, and the ideological division on the Court is apparent. As a result, the
replacement of any members of the conservative wing (Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-and particularly the
lead swing voter Justice O'Connor) could "well result in an avulsive
change in the ideological stance of the Court.
168
166. See 2000 Study, supra note 1, at 326.
167. See 2000 Study, supra note 1, at 326.
168. Id. at327.
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APPENDIX A
1. The Universe of Cases
The only cases included in the database are those cases decided by full
opinion. Decisions on motions have been excluded, even if accompanied
by an opinion. Cases handled by summary disposition are included only if
they are accompanied by a full opinion of the Court and not if the only
opinion is a dissent. Cases decided by a four-four vote resulting in
affirmation without written opinion have been excluded. Both signed and
unsigned per curiam opinions are considered full opinions if they set forth
reasons in a more than perfunctory manner. Cases not fitting within any of
these categories are not included in the database for any of the tables.
2. Cases Classified as Civil or Criminal
The classification of cases as civil or criminal follows commonly
understood definitions. Generally, the nature of the case is clearly
identified in the opinion. Only occasionally does a case pose a problem of
classification. No cases in 2001 raised such a question.
3. Cases Classified by Nature of the Parties - Data Tables I through 4
Cases are included on Data Tables I through 4 only if governmental
and private entities appear as opposing parties. This is necessarily true of
criminal cases. Civil cases are excluded from these tables if they do not
satisfy this criterion. The governmental entity might be the United States
government or one of its agencies or officials, or, with respect to a state
government, one of its political subdivisions. A suit against a government
official in a personal capacity is included if that official is represented by
government attorneys, or if the interests of the government are otherwise
clearly implicated. In instances of multiple parties, a civil case is excluded
if governmental entities appear on both sides of the controversy. If both a
state and a federal entity are parties to the same suit on the same side with
only private parties on the other, the case is included on Data Tables 1 and
2. A case is included more than once on the same table if it raises two or
more distinct issues affecting the outcome of the case and the issues are
resolved by different voting alignments.
4. Classification by Nature of the Issue - Data Tables 5 through 9
A case is included in each category of Data Tables 5 through 9 for
which it raises a relevant issue that is addressed by written opinion. One
case may thus be included on two or more tables. A case is also included
more than once on the same table if it raises two or more distinct issues in
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the category affecting the disposition of the case and the issues are resolved
by different voting alignments. A case is not included on a table if an issue
raised by one of the litigants is not addressed in any opinion.
Identification of First Amendment and equal protection issues poses
no special problem since the nature of each claim is expressly identified in
the opinion. Issues of freedom of speech, press, association, and free
exercise of religion are included. However, Establishment Clause cases are
excluded since one party's claim of religious establishment is often made
against another party's claim of free exercise or some other individual
right, thus bluffing the issue of individual rights.
Statutory civil rights cases included on Data Table 7 are limited to
those invoking the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of
1965, and other civil rights statutes expressly barring discrimination on the
basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, or physical handicap.
Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are included if the substantive
right asserted is based on a federal statute, or if the issue involves the
application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the case at hand. However, 42 U.S.C. §
1983 actions are excluded if the substantive right asserted is based on the
United States Constitution and the issue relates to that constitutional right.
The purpose of this exclusion is to preserve the distinction between
constitutional and non-constitutional claims.
For Data Table 8, jurisdictional questions are defined to include not
only jurisdiction per se, but also standing, mootness, ripeness, abstention,
equitable discretion, and justiciability. Jurisdictional questions are
excluded if neither party challenges jurisdiction and no member of the
Court dissents on the question, even though the Court may comment on its
jurisdiction.
Federalism cases on Data Table 9 are limited to those cases in which
there were issues raised by conflicting actions of federal and state or local
governments. Common examples of these issues are preemption,
intergovernmental immunities, application of the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments as a limit on federal government action, and federal court
interference with state court activities (other than review of state court
decisions). Issues of "horizontal" federalism or interstate relationships,
such as those raised by the dormant Commerce Clause or the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, are excluded from the table.
5. The Swing-vote Cases
Data Table 10 includes all cases where the outcome turns on a single
vote. This category also includes five-four decisions and four-three
decisions, if any, as well as five-three and four-two decisions that reverse a
lower court decision. Affirmations by a vote of five-three or four-two are
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not included because a shift of one vote from the majority to the minority
position would still result in affirmation by a tie vote. A case is included
more than once in the table if it raises two or more distinct issues affecting
the disposition of the case and the issues are resolved by different voting
alignments.
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APPENDIX B
Study Methodology
This Study seeks to quantify three characteristics of Supreme Court
voting behavior: voting trends, mean voting percentages, and relationships
among the Justices' voting patterns. The following sections explain the
statistical methods employed in this Study and how test results should be
interpreted.
A. Scores
Each score in this Study is simply the percentage of times a Justice
voted in favor of the party or claim specified by the category. Some
categories contain fewer samples than others, resulting in coarser score
increments. For example, a category including ten cases during the Term
will have the potential for eleven different scores (0% through 100%, in
10% increments) while a category with only one case during the Term will
provide only two score possibilities (0% and 100%).
B. Predictive Modeling
Data in this project were fitted to an Auto Regressive Integrated
Moving Average (ARIMA) forecasting model. 169 This model is useful in
circumstances where, as in this Study, a single variable (a Justice's score)
is to be forecast based only on its present and prior values with no other
explanatory variables. The model is most easily explained by starting in
the middle of the acronym:
Integrated: This term refers to a differencing process which
operates in a manner similar to differentiation of a
continuous function in calculus. The goal is
simply to remove trend from the time series data
by subtracting each score in the time series from
the next score in the series. The resulting
differences form a new time series. This operation
may be repeated successively until a trend less or
"stationary" series results. Our model employs
only one differencing operation.
169. ARIMA computer modeling was accomplished using MINITAB® statistical software
with p = 1, d = 1, and q = 1. For more information regarding the ARIMA (p,d,q) model, see
PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 248-49 (3d ed. 1992).
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Auto-
Regression: Once the series has been made stationary, an
autoregressive parameter may be determined.1
7 0
This parameter seeks to relate each data point in
the stationary series to the data point immediately
preceding it through multiplication. That is:
X, = AXti
where X, is the value of the data series at point t, A
is the autoregressive parameter, and X,_- is the
value of the data series point immediately
preceding X,.
Because we are dealing with a series of data
points, however, a single parameter will almost
never precisely produce the relationship just
described for all data point pairs. Some error is
inevitable. We therefore seek to determine that
parameter which produces the least total error
when applied to the entire series."'
Moving
Average: A second parameter is determined that relates the
value of each series element X to the error
between the estimated value and the actual value
of the previous element X,-,. That is:
X, = "Bxt-,
where -B is the Moving Average parameter. The
value of this parameter is also optimized to
minimize its total error when applied to the series.
170. Many statistical models employ more than one autoregressive parameter due to various
properties of the data series. Our data uses single-parameter (first order) AR and MA models.
171. This is accomplished by applying least squares estimation, i.e., the parameter is chosen
such that the sum of the squared errors is minimized.
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Synthesis: The previous operations are combined into the
equation:
X, = Ax,-,-Bxt.+ E,
where E, represents the residual error remaining
between the calculated and actual values of X.
This final equation is used to predict the series
score for the upcoming Term.
C. Mean Testing
We use a "student's t test"' 172 to determine whether this Term's score
(X2), departs in a statistically significant manner from the mean of all
previous Terms' scores (XI). Essentially, we treat these two numbers as the
means of two independent samples drawn from the universe of all scores in
the category. 173  We hypothesize that X is also the true mean of the
population gt, and we set up this hypothesis (the "null" hypothesis) and its
corresponding alternative hypothesis as follows:
Ho: pt =X1  The "null" hypothesis, i.e., X 2 does not significantly
shift gt from its previous value on the real number line.
Therefore, the two samples are statistically equivalent.
Ha: gt X, The alternative hypothesis, i.e., X 2 significantly shifts
gi from its previous value on the real number line.
Therefore, the two samples are not statistically
equivalent.
We then set out to prove the alternative hypothesis, within a certain
confidence interval, 74 by rejecting the null hypothesis. 75  This is
accomplished by calculating the following statistic:
172. For a practical perspective on this procedure, see DAVID S. MOORE & GEORGE P.
MCCABE, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACTICE OF STATISTICS 500-18 (2d ed. 1993). See also
CRAIG & HOGG, supra note 6.
173. This approach introduces potential bias problems due to non-random sampling, small
samples, and dissimilar sample standard deviations. Nevertheless, we use the test to impose some
measure of discipline in analyzing the available data.
174. We have selected a confidence interval of 95%. Because this is a two-tailed test,
OVERLINE X SUB 2 may shift ft in either a positive or negative direction, = .025.
175. A full description of the logic behind this seemingly convoluted procedure is beyond the
scope of this article. However, its purpose is to control Type I (or alpha) error. For a complete
explanation, see MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 172.
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t -
S / -n
The result of this equation (t) is compared to the entry on a t-
distribution table corresponding to the confidence interval desired and the
appropriate number of degrees of freedom (n-k). 7 6 If the absolute value of
t is greater than the table entry, H0 is rejected and we say that the Justice
has shown a statistically significant change in voting behavior this Term.
D. Correlation
Relationships between two Justices' voting records may be mapped
over a two-dimensional Cartesian plane as in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1
shows a high degree of positive correlation (R2=0.7921) between the voting
percentages of the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia for the Equal Protection
category. The points all fall close to an upward sloping line. On the other
hand, Figure 2 shows that the voting percentages of the Chief Justice and
Justice Stevens show only a very weak, negative correlation (R2=0.0473).
The points are widely scattered about a downward sloping line.
Statistically significant correlations between and among Justices' term-to-
term voting patterns are shown in Regression Tables 1-10. The first
number in each pair is the Pearson correlation coefficient. The second
number is an r2 statistic, which is a more reliable measure of the actual
level of correlation. 1
77
176. k = the number of parameters being tested; here, I is the only hypothesized parameter,
sok= 1.
177. The r2 statistic is an estimate of p2 , the true measure of correlation between the
dependant variable and its independent counterpart(s). The "adjusted" r2 value in the tables is a
result of the computer's attempts to filter out any bias in the original r2 result.
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The correlation measured in this case is in the term-to-term movement
of Justices' scores. A high correlation between two Justices does not mean
that they necessarily vote together often. It simply means that their scores
tend to move up and down together from one Term to another. Also note
that correlation in no way implies causation.
E. Factor Analysis
Factor analysis has long been used by psychologists who attempt to
identify characteristics of personality or intelligence by using a battery of
tests. Their challenge has been to develop tests that validly measure the
characteristics of interest. This Study similarly attempts to measure the
Justices' liberal and conservative leanings by "testing" their disposition of
certain types of cases.
We performed a factor analysis of the Study categories using Minitab
software. The factor loadings presented were obtained by extracting a
single factor, using principal components analysis and applying a QMAX
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rotation to the data. A full description of the theory and mathematics
underlying factor analysis is beyond the scope of this appendix, but several
books on the subject are available that provide reasonably simple
explanations of this complex process.178
F. Frontier Analysis
Frontier analysis can probably best be described with an example.
Suppose four individuals are competing for the title of "world's greatest






Alan would argue that the title should go to the best croquet player
because he has scored highest in the croquet category, while Debbie would
argue that the best marbles player should win because she has scored
highest in that category. On the other hand, Betty would argue that each
sport should receive equal weight, because her combined score with equal
weightings would be higher than either Alan's or Debbie's, i.e., Betty
would score (7 x 0.5) + (7 x 0.5) = 7, while Alan would score (9 x 0.5) + (2
x 0.5) = 5.5, Chuck would score (4 x 0.5) + (5 x 0.5) = 4.5, and Debbie






178. See generally DENNIS CHILD, THE ESSENTIALS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1990).
10
0
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A, B, C, and D represent the athletes. The solid line connecting
points A, B, and D represents the athletic frontier, i.e., the boundary
beyond which no athlete has performed regardless of the relative weights
assigned to marbles and croquet. A, B, and D are located at 100% of the
frontier. Moreover, B can be said to be super-efficient to the extent her
point lies beyond the line AD connecting the two points adjacent to it on
the frontier. A and D are also super-efficient to the extent they lie beyond
lines (not shown) connecting B with the points at which the frontier meets
each axis. C falls short of the frontier regardless of the weights assigned to
marbles and croquet. However, an optimal set of weights may be selected
such that C "looks his best," i.e., he comes closest to reaching the frontier.
The same concept can be applied to the Court to determine which
Justice is "most conservative" or "most liberal." However, instead of two
dimensions (croquet and marbles), the Court analysis includes nine
dimensions (all study categories except Swing-votes). Although human
minds have difficulty envisioning nine dimensions, computers can handle
the required calculations with ease. We performed our analysis using
Microsoft Excel's solver feature. Although the formulas and procedures
involved are straightforward, a complete description of them is beyond the
scope of this appendix.1
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179. For more information on frontier analysis, see DONALD L. ADOLPHSON, MANAGER'S
TOOLKIT: MANAGERIAL SPREADSHEET ANALYSIS (1998).
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